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Beijing’s strategic encirclement of Australia 
 
     (2598 words) 
 
 
No country has come close to China’s long-term growth rate, which has averaged a 
remarkable 9.5% over the last 40 years. This sustained high level of economic growth has 
enabled a parallel expansion in defence spending. While NATO countries are struggling to hit 
2% growth targets, China’s defence budget increased by 7% in 2021. Rising military capability 
has encouraged national assertiveness, and a ratcheting up of military pressure against 
Taiwan. Several military airfields have been built close to Taiwan, facilitating a dramatic rise 
in military aircraft incursions into Taiwanese airspace. Observers interpret this growing 
military momentum as a prelude to actual combat, perhaps during the present decade, even 
within the next six years. For an invasion to be credible, naval dominance will be paramount, 
and this explains the push behind Beijing’s remarkable shipbuilding programme.  
 
China's shipbuilding numbers have always been impressive, dwarfing even the US efforts of 
World War II. In 2019, for instance, China built more ships in a year of peace than the US did 
in four of war (1941-1945). Reportedly across 2014-18, China launched more submarines, 
warships, amphibious vessels, and auxiliaries than the number of ships currently serving in 
the individual navies of Germany, India, Spain, and the United Kingdom. By 2025, the 
PLA(Navy) is predicted to comprise 400 battle force ships, compared to the planned US fleet 
of 355.  This huge naval build-up coincides with China reinforcing its claims to the 3.3 million 
square-kilometre South China Sea. The attraction is twofold. Firstly, the area has abundant 
resources, such as hydrocarbons, oil, gas, and fisheries, and secondly, Beijing seeks to protect 
its trade routes for the essential imports sustaining rapid industrialisation. Accordingly, China 
is building artificial islands and military facilities in the Spratly and Paracel chains to respond 
to threats and exploit intelligence gathering, surveillance system surprise, and cyber warfare. 
 
China’s projection of maritime capability hints of ‘strategic-reach’ ambitions going beyond 
reunification of Taiwan and the militarisation of the South China Sea. More likely Beijing aims 
to become a regional Asia-Pacific hegemonic power via exploitation of both hard-power 
threats and soft-power inducements to reassert itself as a new ‘Middle Kingdom’. The 'China 
Dream' aims to close the page on what it views as a century of humiliation and to ensure that 
into the future its periphery is secure through a ring of vassal states serving Beijing's eco-
strategic interests. This is just a first step, however, with China’s naval superiority acting to 
secure ‘far seas protection’ of its growing overseas assets. From the hard power perspective, 
the process began with the 2017 opening of Beijing’s first overseas military facility in Djibouti 
on the shores of the troubled Red Sea and the building of a potentially military port at Gwadar, 
Pakistan, facing the Arabian Sea. Exercise of soft power, by contrast, is more focused on 
acquiring overseas economic assets and nurturing diplomatic influence. The process has been 
catalysed through the 2013 launching of Beijing’s US$4tn Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  
 
The BRI targets the building of roads, railways, ports, and other eco-strategic infrastructure. 
Chinese state-owned companies now control about 76 ports in 35 countries - including 
Darwin. A 2020 Washington CSIS Think Tank Report identified 46 African ports where China 
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has financial, construction and operational involvement. This reincarnation of the Silk Road 
Economic Belt is written into China’s Constitution and aims to touch 60% of the world’s 
population through offering major investments financed through long-term loans. In Asia, for 
instance, China is pushing Thailand to agree construction of the 100km Kra canal, on the scale 
of Panama, linking the South China Sea with the Bay of Bengal, and thus bypassing the 
crowded Strait of Malacca. For the West, the Kra canal exemplifies the common danger of the 
BRI acting as a vehicle for Beijing’s potential acquisition of overseas infrastructural assets, 
contributing to a broadening and deepening of China’s strategic influence. Chinese asset 
acquisition invariably occurs through ‘debt traps.’ For instance, Sri Lanka’s inability to repay a 
$6bn debt to China led to it taking a controlling 70% stake and a 99-year-lease in the 
Hambantota port, as a means of repaying the burden. Similarly, Beijing has built a new port 
at Kyaukpyu, Myanmar, and taken a 70% controlling stake after Myanmar defaulted on its 
repayments. China now has the potential for a naval base on the Indian Ocean side of the 
Malacca Strait chokepoint, projecting power across the Bay of Bengal. The recent loss of office 
by Maldives’ former President Yameen, a close friend of Beijing, spotlights how this Indian 
Ocean territory can repay Chinese loans for a major airstrip and an ambitious China-Maldives 
Friendship Bridge. Significantly, the Maldives is also home to an abandoned British naval 
facility, ripe for Chinese redevelopment.  
 
China’s BRI transition from soft into hard power is aimed at weakening the West’s traditional 
‘Three Island Chain’ encirclement of China, encompassing what Beijing claims are around 250 
US military installations ringing the Chinese mainland. Several of these are in Australia, 
representing the West’s principal geo-strategic buttress to China’s Grand Strategy of Pacific 
domination. If China encroaches into the Pacific, Canberra’s traditional sphere of interest, the 
Continent will face the beginnings of a ‘reverse’ Chinese containment strategy. The process 
began years ago, with PLA delegations visiting 24 Pacific islands between 2006 and 2019, 
more than 60% involving PLA(Navy) ships. This emerging threat has begun to focus the minds 
of Canberra’s policymakers, as the danger of conflict increases. Earlier in 2021, US Secretary 
of State, Antony Blinken, singled out China’s “blatant economic coercion of Australia” as an 
example of the urgent threats that democratic nations around the world face from 
increasingly assertive authoritarian regimes. Using similar bellicose language, Mike Pezzullo, 
Australia's Home Affairs Department Secretary, warned that liberal democracies must brace 
themselves for war. Mr Pezzulo did not offer a specific reason for his remark, but tensions 
with China, particularly Taiwan, are almost certainly a factor. The Global Times, the Chinese 
Communist Party’s journalistic mouthpiece, responded by threatening that China would 
launch "ballistic missiles" against Australia if it makes "any incursion" towards Taiwan.  
 
The catastrophic decline in Sino-Australia relations has led to a 40% hike in Canberra’s 
defence spending over the next decade, with an enormous US$200bn allocated to improving 
long-range strike capabilities. The US will assume the role a ‘strategic partner’ and likely 
support Australia’s plan to build a sovereign guided weapons capability in a US$735mn 
project to address local supply chain vulnerability in the event of a regional conflict. 
Additionally, Prime Minister Morrison has announced a US$550mn upgrade of military 
training bases, which would be used in any conflict with China. The most important of them, 
Pine Gap, in central Australia acts as a geospatial operations and intelligence hub. On top of 
its role in America's global drone surveillance and targeting programmes, Pine Gap is also a 
vital piece of the US' nuclear warfighting apparatus, the capabilities and destructive capacity 
 3 
of which have been dramatically expanded in recent years. Australia also plays host to a fully 
equipped US Marine Air-Ground Task Force stationed in Darwin. There are planned upgrades 
of shooting ranges and airstrips and new training facilities for both Australian troops and US 
marines. More than 2,000 US Marines have already travelled to Northern Australia to 
participate in annual joint training activities. 
 
 
There are additional testy politico-economic dimensions to the souring of Canberra-Beijing 
relations. China is no longer supine in the face of international criticism and was irked by the 
Federal Government’s 2020 call for an international inquiry into the origins of the coronavirus 
pandemic, its criticism of Beijing’s ill-treatment of the Uighurs and its restrictions on 
democracy in Hong Kong. This then spiralled into a series of tit-for-tat spying accusations, 
including claims of Chinese interference on Australian university campuses and counterclaims 
that the universities were discriminating against Chinese students. However, behind the 
political rhetoric lies the economic leverage that China can exert. Trade disputes have 
proliferated, including Beijing’s decision to halt or severely restrict Australian exports, such as 
coal, beef, wine, barley, timber, grapes, and seafood. By some measure, China is Australia’s 
biggest trading partner, accounting for almost 33% of its exports. In particular, the mining of 
iron ore is hugely dependent on China’s big internal demand for steel production. Thus, 
weaning itself off addiction to Chinese markets will not be painless, especially since Beijing is 
not averse to retaliatory economic pressure. Nevertheless, Canberra went ahead and blocked 
a Chinese commercial takeover in the state of Victoria, as part of China’s global BRI 
programme and is additionally considering whether the Chinese-owned Landbridge Group 
should be forced to give up its 99-year lease of Port Darwin, on national security grounds.  
 
Australia’s closest neighbour, New Zealand, is also heavily dependent on Chinese demand, 
accounting for around 30% of its exports, but in contrast to Canberra’s robust response to 
Chinese ‘wolf’ eco-diplomacy, Wellington’s reaction has been muted. Indeed, there are signs 
that New Zealand is even willing to increase diplomatic cooperation with China.  The Foreign 
Affairs Minister, Nanaia Mahuta, has stated that the government was ‘uncomfortable’ with 
Asia’s Five Eyes Alliance expanding its remit beyond intelligence-sharing and New Zealand 
was also the only Five-Eyes’ member not to sign a joint statement condemning Beijing’s new 
security laws in Hong Kong. 
 
Canberra, of course, recognises that the importance of such strategic partnerships extends 
beyond Australia, not least because its national security is necessarily dependent on regional 
security. It thus watches with growing alarm China’s efforts to spread its influence into 
Australia’s ‘backyard’, even extending to Antarctica. Here, Beijing has recently announced 
plans to build a large all-year-round airport 17 miles from its Zhongshan ice research station, 
located in East Antarctica within the 42% of the continent claimed by Australia. The project 
will compete with Canberra’s plans to construct a 1.6-mile paved airstrip for its Davis research 
station, allowing access to RAAF C-17 aircraft. While both countries seek to justify their 
respective investments on research grounds, there is no doubt that the reported presence of 
sizable energy and mineral resources acts as a decisive pull factor.  
 
While China’s growing presence in Antarctica is of grave concern, the principal fear is that 
China’s long-term plan is to establish a strategic foothold in the Pacific islands from which it 
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could threaten Australia. President Xi has already sought to engage numerous islands to 
participate in a Pacific maritime 'Silk Road'. As elsewhere, the first step will be to entice small 
Pacific Island states to take on unaffordable loans as part of China’s debt trap strategy of 
acquiring strategically important maritime infrastructure. Beijing's loans do not come cheap, 
and Australia’s Lowry Institute cautions that such indebtedness gives China significant 
leverage over Pacific nations to convert loans into equity in infrastructure. For example, 
witness Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) experience in the telecommunications sector where 
Chinese firms continue to make large promises of new fibre optic connections, 4G towers, 
and data centres, even though PNG owes China’s Exim Bank US$526mn on existing projects. 
The island government is now concerned about repayment and frustrated that many of 
China’s investments have operationally failed. To thwart the intentions of state-controlled 
Chinese telco giant Huawei, Australia’s Prime Minister Turnbull in early 2021 promised PNG 
that funding would be available for a new undersea internet cable. Yet the promises continue, 
with Beijing offering to build a US$30bn city, including a large port, on PNG’s impoverished 
South Coast, less than 50 miles from Australian territory across the strategically important 
Torres Strait. Chinese investment in PNG has risen dramatically over recent years, especially 
in infrastructure projects. By 2017, China had reportedly invested more than US$3.6bn solely 
in building essential roads. 
 
Elsewhere, in 2013, 64% of Tonga's foreign debt was owed to China, amounting to 43% of the 
Pacific island’s annual GDP. Tonga has reportedly warmed to the idea of writing off this 
burden by allowing Beijing to establish a naval base on the island. Vanuatu is similarly 
indebted to Beijing, owing around $US1.7bn. In 2019, China was reportedly seeking a 
permanent military presence on the island. Lending weight to this report, Vanuatu’s Chinese 
built $85mn Luganville wharf seems more suited to navy vessels than cruise ships. Vanuatu's 
location is particularly strategic as it lies within the sea lines of communication between the 
US and Australia. China also has advanced plans to build a US$100mn wharf in Samoa, close 
to the capital city Apia, but these were thwarted when Samoa’s long-serving pro-China Prime 
Minister was ousted. The wharf would have been capable of berthing 12 large vessels, fuelling 
fears of a Chinese military Pacific base potentially bigger than any in Australasia. China’s 
investments in Samoa are already sizable, representing more than 40% of its national debt, 
with China increasingly pressuring Samoa to repay its debts. While Fiji’s indebtedness to China 
is only 10%, small compared to Tonga and Samoa, for years it has been the beneficiary of PLA 
military equipment donations. Fiji is pursuing a ‘Look North’ policy, and the ensuing warmer 
relations with China has encouraged the latter to invest US$1bn in around 300 investment 
projects, including the usual infrastructural targets of roads, dams, and bridges, as well as 
goldmining. 
  
On the Eastern edge of Micronesia, Beijing is reportedly interested in refurbishing and 
expanding Kiribati’s remote and rundown 6,000-foot WWII airstrip. Under the guise of 
economic development and climate change adaption, the airstrip’s geostrategic significance 
is obvious, given sensitive US military installations in Hawaii located 1,800 miles across the 
Pacific. South of Kiribati lies New Caledonia, and it too is looking vulnerable to Chinese 
influence. If a recent referendum on breaking ties with France had been successful, New 
Caledonia would have inevitably invited interest from China, as the territory owns around 
25% of the world’s nickel reserves, presently generating about US$1.1bn of sales to China. 
New Caledonia’s independence would have dealt a serious blow to Macron’s vision 
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enunciated during his 2018 visit to the territory. He proposed a ‘Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis, 
representing joint objectives to address Chinese challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. In a 
later Pacific visit in 2021, President Macron visited French Polynesia, and announced that 
France would support South Pacific nations in launching a local coastguard network to 
counter China’s predatory paramilitary fishing vessels. Moreover, in discussions with Japan’s 
Prime Minister, Yoshihide Suga, a joint statement was issued that the two nations would work 
more closely on defence for a ‘free Pacific’ to arrest China’s expansionism. 
 
While sparsely populated, the broad swathe of states in Oceania control immense marine 
resources and represent a potentially decisive bloc of votes in bodies, like the UN, that China 
has sought to influence to isolate Taiwan. Pressure can move both ways, however. Taipei has 
warned the Solomon Islands that its efforts to forge closer links with China will replace four 
decades of a stable diplomatic allegiance with “flashy infrastructure” sourced through 
destabilising debt and causing permanent damage to local ecosystems. Canberra has recently 
signed a Security Treaty with the Solomon Islands and has also fought off Chinese competition 
to sign a 2019 MoU for the redevelopment the Fijian Black Rock Military Training Centre in 
Suva. Similar security partnership understandings have also been negotiated with Tuvalu and 
Nauru, and Kiribati is in talks. Additionally, Australia has opened new Embassies in the 
Marshall Islands and French Polynesia. Such responses to China’s funding of local 
infrastructure and dual-use projects are to be applauded. However, while Australian military 
and diplomatic agreements are important elements in the security mix, there is an important 
supplementary need to fill the socio-economic development policy vacuum by forging a 
framework of tangible investment support packages designed to ‘win the hearts and minds’ 
of the Pacific Island peoples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
